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THE INTERPRETATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY,  
OR CHARLES BEARD BECOMES A 
FORTUNETELLER (WITH AN  
EMPHASIS ON FREE EXPRESSION) 
Stephen M. Feldman* 
In An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the 
United States, published in 1913, Charles A. Beard argued that the 
framers and contemporaneous supporters of ratification advo-
cated for and defended the Constitution because of their eco-
nomic interests.1 “The point is,” he wrote, “that the direct, impel-
ling motive . . . was the economic advantages which the 
beneficiaries expected would accrue to themselves first, from 
their action.”2 The bulk of the book focused on the framers, with 
Beard marshaling empirical evidence that ostensibly detailed 
their personal property holdings.3 From this evidence, Beard 
claimed to show that the framers represented “distinct groups 
whose economic interests they understood and felt in concrete, 
definite form through their own personal experience with identi-
cal property rights.”4 
Beard acknowledged that numerous framers had proclaimed 
they were motivated by a virtuous desire to promote the “general 
welfare” or the “public good”—or as it is frequently called, the 
common good.5 Yet, Beard dismissed the notion of the common 
good as a “vague thing.”6 He explained that invocation of “the 
 * Housel/Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Wyoming. 
 1. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES (1986 Free Press ed.; 1st ed. 1913). 
 2. Id. at 17–18. 
 3. Id. at 73–151. 
 4. Id. at 73. As others have noted, Beard did not precisely define the concept of an 
economic interpretation. Sometimes, he seemed to associate it with a “profit motive,” and 
other times, he seemed to associate it with a general (economic) class interest. Forrest 
McDonald, A New Introduction, in BEARD, supra note 1, at vii, xiii–iv (1986 ed.). 
 5. E.g., BEARD, supra note 1, at 17, 157, 199, 202, 204. 
 6. Id. at 17. 
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general good is a passive force, and unless we know who are the 
several individuals that benefit in its name, it has no meaning.”7 
In other words, pursuit of the common good was not so much a 
motive as a veneer, which obscured economic interests.8 
A century after the publication of An Economic Interpreta-
tion, one can fairly conclude both that the book was “seminal” and 
that subsequent scholarship has “undermined Beard’s thesis.”9 
When An Economic Interpretation first appeared, most reviewers 
greeted it with hostility.10 Over the next decades, though, it be-
came increasingly influential until, by the 1940s, it had become the 
“prevailing orthodoxy.”11 In the 1950s, Beard’s fortune swung 
again: Critics and defenders engaged in a well-publicized battle.12 
Many of Beard’s critics, though, continued to follow an economic 
approach to the framing, even as they disagreed with the details 
of Beard’s argument.13 The nature of framing historiography, 
however, started to change dramatically in the late 1960s. Several 
historians argued persuasively that one could better understand 
the framing (and the Revolution) by focusing on political ideology 
rather than economic interests.14 As this more ideological ap-
proach became ascendant, one of its most prominent practition-
ers, Gordon Wood, unceremoniously pronounced Beard’s thesis 
to be “undeniably dead.”15 And in fact, while several historians 
have chipped away at the edifice of the ideological approach, with 
its emphasis on civic republicanism,16 it still dominates the skyline 
of historical scholarship on the framing.17 
 7. Id. at 155. 
 8. See, e.g., id. at 73 (emphasizing “economic motives”). 
 9. McDonald, supra note 4, at ix. 
 10. Id. at xviii–xx. Such hostility, however, was not universal. Id. 
 11. Id. at xxii. 
 12. For summaries of both sides of the battle, see ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (Leonard W. Levy ed., 2d ed. 1987); McDonald, supra note 4, at xxvi–xxxii. 
 13. E.g., Forrest McDonald, The Beard Thesis Attacked, II: A Political-Economic 
Approach, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 12, at 
113  (arguing that Beard’s focus on personal property was too simplistic). 
 14. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); GORDON 
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969); see FORREST 
MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM (1985) (attempting to integrate multiple ap-
proaches). 
 15. WOOD, supra note 14, at 626. 
 16. Forum: The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (A Symposium of 
Views and Reviews), 44 WM. & MARY Q. 549 (1987). Forrest McDonald, when discussing 
civic republicanism, acknowledged that Wood has done “the most nearly exhaustive 
study,” but then added, “I disagree in many ways with Wood’s analysis.” MCDONALD, 
supra note 14, at 67 n.25. 
 17. See Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995) (assessing the historical scholarship at that point in time).  
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Thus, the current historical consensus is that Beard’s thrust—
his focus on the framers as creating a capitalist order primarily to 
protect their own interests—is incorrect. In this essay, I largely 
agree with this critical assessment of Beard’s historical approach, 
though with qualifications. One might say that Wood exaggerated 
Beard’s demise: A consideration of economic interests can help 
illuminate the ideology of the founding. To be sure, Beard missed 
most of the story of the founding, but his economic approach can 
still add an important element to the discussion. Plus, as I explain, 
despite Beard’s historical errors, he has become a prescient for-
tuneteller. His economic depiction of the Constitution does not 
closely fit the framing, but it uncannily fits the Roberts Court’s 
current interpretation of our constitutional order. Beard might 
have gotten the history wrong, but he got the future right. 
Part I summarizes an ideological approach while also ex-
plaining how a consideration of economic interests illuminates the 
founding. It emphasizes how the framers conceived of citizenship 
and government in republican democratic terms, even though 
they were strongly concerned with the protection of individual 
rights, especially property rights.18 Ultimately, the framers sought 
balance between government power and economic interests: They 
sought to enhance the protection of property rights, but they sim-
ultaneously empowered government to act for the common good, 
even at the expense of property. Part I concludes with a discussion 
of free expression under republican democracy and an assessment 
of Beard’s interpretation of the framing. Part II describes how so-
cial and cultural forces led to the collapse of republican democ-
racy and the rise of pluralist democracy in the early twentieth cen-
tury. This transition, as explained, changed the conception of free 
expression. The Part concludes by examining how pluralist de-
mocracy continued to evolve after World War II. Part III focuses 
on the Roberts Court and its landmark First Amendment deci-
sion, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.19 This Part 
underscores the overlap between Beard’s thesis and the Roberts 
Court’s interpretation of the framing and the Constitution. Part 
IV, the Conclusion, suggests how politics might have influenced 
both Beard’s and the Roberts Court’s interpretations of constitu-
tional history. 
 18. My definition of republican democracy, as will become clear, overlaps but is not 
identical with a technical definition of civic republicanism. See RICHARD C. SINOPOLI, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 9–12 (1992) (discussing definitional problems 
related to civic republicanism). 
 19. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
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I. THE FOUNDERS AND REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY 
From the founding until the early twentieth century, the na-
tion operated as a republican democratic regime.20 Under repub-
lican democracy, citizens and elected officials were supposed to 
be virtuous: in the political realm, they were to pursue the com-
mon good or public welfare rather than their own “private and 
partial interests.”21 When citizens or officials used governmental 
institutions to pursue their own interests, then the government 
was corrupt. Groups of like-minded citizens who corrupted the 
government were deemed factions, whether constituted by a ma-
jority or a minority of citizens. In Federalist Number 10, James 
Madison described a faction as “a number of citizens, whether 
amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are 
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of 
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the perma-
nent and aggregate interests of the community.”22 By definition, 
then, a factionally controlled government pursues “partial inter-
ests”23 or “private passions”24 rather than the common good. 
Founding-era Americans believed they were especially well-
suited for this form of government. An agrarian economy where 
many white Protestant men were freeholders engendered a rough 
material equality, unknown elsewhere in the world, and this ma-
terial equality in turn engendered a culture of political equality.25 
“I think our governments will remain virtuous for many centu-
ries,” Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1787, “as long as they are chiefly 
agricultural; and this will be as long as there shall be vacant lands 
in any part of America.”26 Sixteen years later, St. George Tucker 
echoed Jefferson: “[S]cenes of violence, tumult, and commotion,” 
which had destroyed earlier republics, Tucker explained, “can 
 20. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A 
HISTORY 14–45, 153–208 (2008). 
 21. WOOD, supra note 14, at 59; e.g., Virginia Bill of Rights (1776), reprinted in THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1908, 1908 (Ben Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878) (emphasiz-
ing government for “the common benefit”). 
 22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (note: all citations to the Federalist 
are to the Project Gutenberg eText of The Federalist Papers); see James Madison, In Vir-
ginia Convention, June 5, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC 
WRITINGS 46, 46 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) (arguing that majority factions have produced 
unjust laws) [hereinafter COMPLETE]. 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison). 
 24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 25. See WOOD, supra note 14, at 100 (quoting Josiah Quincy). 
 26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 
GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 112, 115 (Richard Hofstadter ed., 1958).  
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never be apprehended [in America], whilst we remain, as at pre-
sent, an agricultural people, dispersed over an immense terri-
tory.”27 Moreover, with an overwhelming number of Americans 
being committed to Protestantism and tracing their ancestral 
roots to Western or Northern Europe, the people seemed suffi-
ciently homogeneous to join together in the pursuit of the com-
mon good.28 
Two aspects of republican democratic government, as under-
stood by the founders, are worth underscoring. First, although not 
all Americans were white Protestant Anglo-Saxons, political ex-
clusion preserved at least a surface homogeneity. According to re-
publican democratic theory, non-virtuous individuals (or non-vir-
tuous societal groups) would be unwilling to forgo the pursuit of 
their own private interests. Instead, they would form factions bent 
on corruption.29 Significantly, then, an alleged lack of civic virtue 
could supposedly justify the forced exclusion of a group from the 
polity. On this pretext, African Americans, Irish-Catholic immi-
grants, women, and other peripheral groups were precluded from 
participating in republican democracy for much of American his-
tory.30 Thus, although the concepts of virtue and the common 
good typically remained nebulous in the abstract, they closely mir-
rored mainstream white Protestant male values and interests in 
concrete political (and judicial) contexts. 
Second, the framers believed that the state governments of 
the 1780s provided valuable experiences in the drafting of consti-
tutions. Most important, the state constitutions had been too op-
timistic: They had conceptualized American citizens as predomi-
nantly virtuous. Virtue alone supposedly would sustain the 
republican state governments. Experience had deflated that opti-
mism. That was the lesson of Shays’s Rebellion in Massachusetts, 
where indebted landowners sought governmental refuge for 
money owed. John Jay wrote to George Washington: “Private 
rage for property suppresses public considerations, and personal 
 27. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 31 (1803). 
 28. THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 219 (1986); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE 
DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE 161–68 (1997); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay) (emphasizing 
the homogeneity of the American people). 
 29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 30. FELDMAN, supra note 20, at 23–26, 38–40, 293–94. Of course, other forces—and 
pretexts—also contributed to the exclusion of peripheral groups.  
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rather than national interests have become the great objects of 
attention. Representative bodies will ever be faithful copies of 
their originals, and generally exhibit a checkered assemblage of 
virtue and vice, of abilities and weakness.”31 All too often, it 
seemed, factional groups used the institutions of government to 
satisfy their own interests.32 
Consequently, the framers believed that, in constructing a re-
publican government, they needed to devote greater attention to 
protecting individual rights, especially property rights.33 Before 
the Revolution, Americans understood the need to protect indi-
vidual rights from the British monarchy. With the repudiation of 
the monarchy, however, the protection of rights from the govern-
ment seemed less urgent. After all, in the American (state) repub-
lics, the people were the source of government, and the govern-
ment represented the people. Could the people threaten their 
own rights? Surprisingly, the experiences of the 1780s had an-
swered that question affirmatively. Thus, now, Publius unequivo-
cally declared that Lockean rights to liberty and property must be 
strongly protected.34 Even though liberty and property caused fac-
tionalism—Madison metaphorically explained that “[l]iberty is to 
faction what air is to fire”—protecting such individual rights 
should be, said Madison, “the first object of government.”35 
Even so, the framers refused to sacrifice their civic republican 
principles. “The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to 
be,” Madison declared, “first to obtain for rulers men who possess 
most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common 
good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effec-
tual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to 
hold their public trust.”36 How, then, could a constitution respect 
 31. Letter from John Jay to George Washington (June 27, 1786), reprinted in 2 
GREAT ISSUES, supra note 26, at 80-81; see WOOD, supra note 14, at 410–13 (discussing 
Shays’ Rebellion). 
 32. See, e.g., James Wilson, In the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 138, 141–42, app. A (Max Farrand 
ed., 1966 reprint of 1937 rev. ed.) [hereinafter Farrand] (lamenting licentiousness of citi-
zens and governmental problems). 
 33. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing republican 
problems arising from human nature). 
 34. The very meaning of liberty shifted. Under civic republicanism, liberty primarily 
concerned individual freedom to participate in government. Now, liberty also concerned 
the pursuit of self-interest in the private sphere. WOOD, supra note 14, at 24, 609; see 
MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 4, 9–55 (emphasizing ambiguity of terms such as liberty). 
 35. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison).  
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individual rights while simultaneously maintaining civic republi-
can principles? The framers answered this question by conceptu-
ally distinguishing two separate spheres: that of civil society or the 
private sphere, and that of government or the public sphere.37 In 
the private sphere, individuals were expected to act as self-inter-
ested commercial and economic strivers. If people enjoyed lib-
erty, then they would revel in their passions and interests. The 
strongest and most enduring interest was economic (property and 
wealth).38 Moreover, the framers recognized that many if not most 
citizens would be motivated to pursue their own passions and in-
terests not only in the commercial or private world but also in the 
public world. They understood that factions would inevitably 
form and seek to control government. 
But still, the framers insisted that virtue and reason could 
overcome passion and interest in public affairs and that, there-
fore, government could be conducted in accord with civic repub-
lican ideals.39 The framers believed in the existence of a virtuous 
elite—including themselves—who would pursue the common 
good in the public sphere even while pursuing their own interests 
in the private sphere. In a properly structured constitutional sys-
tem, the people would at least sometimes elect the virtuous elite 
to public offices. And in the event that an insufficiently virtuous 
individual were elected, the system would be structured to control 
the “effects” of self-interest and factionalism.40 Mechanisms such 
as federalism, separation of powers, bicameralism, and checks and 
balances dispersed power among a multitude of governmental in-
stitutions, departments, and officials, each of which would have its 
own interests.41 “[T]he constant aim is to divide and arrange the 
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on 
the other—that the private interest of every individual may be a 
sentinel over the public rights.”42 In other words, the Constitution 
 37. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (distinguishing between 
“public and private faith” as well as “public and personal liberty”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 
14 (James Madison) (emphasizing government would be “in favor of private rights and 
public happiness”). 
 38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990) (emphasizing 
the importance of property to the framers). 
 39. MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 189–209; POCOCK, supra note 14, at 513–26; 
WOOD, supra note 14, at 391–468. “In the civic humanist ethos, then, the individual knew 
himself to be rational and virtuous.” POCOCK, supra note 14, at 466. 
 40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 41. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Madison discussing the ad-
vantages of a bicameral legislature and an executive veto on legislative actions). 
 42. Id.  
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dispersed power among so many institutions, departments, and 
officials that the self-interested grasping of one would inevitably 
be met by the self-interested grasping of another. Ultimately, the 
framers intended the various structural mechanisms to promote 
the virtuous pursuit of the common good in the public sphere and 
simultaneously to protect individual rights and liberties in the pri-
vate sphere.43 
What, then, was the relationship between the government 
and individual rights, as understood by the framers? On the one 
hand, the framers feared that factions—especially factions consti-
tuted by the poor—would use governmental institutions to tram-
ple individual rights, particularly property rights. Thus, the vari-
ous checks and mechanisms in the constitutional system were 
needed to temper the democratic potential of the government. On 
the other hand, and perhaps most important, the framers believed 
the government could diminish or infringe on individual rights 
and liberties if the government acted in pursuit of the common 
good (and otherwise acted consistently with the Constitution).44 
In this sense, the public took priority over the private. James Wil-
son, for instance, stated: “[A]s I have said before, no government, 
either single or confederated, can exist, unless private and indi-
vidual rights are subservient to the public and general happiness 
of the nation.”45 The Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights ex-
plicitly manifested this view: “nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”46 In other words, the 
Constitution protected private property, but even so, the govern-
ment could still take private property for public use—that is, to 
promote the common good—so long as the government paid just 
compensation.47 From the framers’ perspective, the pursuit of the 
 43. “To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, 
and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then 
the great object to which our inquiries are directed.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James 
Madison); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison) (arguing that the new govern-
ment would be “in favor of private rights and public happiness”). Rogers Smith writes: 
“The founders of the United States did indeed define and construct their new nation in 
accord with Enlightenment doctrines of individual liberties and republican self-govern-
ance more than any regime before and most since.” ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS 
470–71 (1997). 
 44. Nedelsky argues that the framers created a system where ordinary people consent 
to their governance without truly governing themselves. NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 149. 
 45. James Wilson, supra note 32, at 141, appendix A; see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE 
PEOPLE’S WELFARE 9–11 (1996) (emphasizing that the superiority of the public over the 
private sphere continued at least through the nineteenth century). 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 47. In a similar vein, Madison repeatedly argued that the government could assist a 
particular business enterprise if doing so would further the common good. James Madison,  
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common good simultaneously empowered and limited the gov-
ernment. The government could take almost any action—even 
taking property—so long as it was for the common good, but sim-
ultaneously, the government could not do anything, unless it was 
for the common good. In this way, the framers aimed to achieve a 
balance between governmental power and the protection of prop-
erty and other rights.48 Or, from another perspective, the Consti-
tution successfully curbed the democratic energies of the people 
without disabling the government. 
Of course, subsequent to the founding, individuals would 
sometimes challenge the legality of governmental actions. During 
the long-running republican democratic era, courts would fre-
quently resolve such disputes by focusing on the distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, the common good and, on the other, par-
tial or private interests, or as it was sometimes phrased, the 
difference between reasonable and arbitrary action (arbitrary ac-
tion was sometimes categorized as class legislation).49 The key to 
the judicial analysis was the categorization of the governmental 
purpose: Was it for the common good or not? If the legislature 
had acted for the common good, then the court would uphold the 
government’s action. If the legislature had instead acted for the 
benefit of private or partial interests, then the court would invali-
date the government’s action. In the early decades of nationhood, 
courts would frequently emphasize that the government could not 
indiscriminately take property from one citizen and give it to an-
other. In typical language, Chief Justice Stephen Hosmer of Con-
necticut stated, “If . . . the legislature should enact a law, without 
any assignable reason, taking from A. his estate, and giving it to 
B., the injustice would be flagrant, and the act would produce a 
In First Congress (Apr. 9, 1789), reprinted in COMPLETE, supra note 22, at 276; James Mad-
ison, In First Congress (1789), reprinted in COMPLETE, supra note 22, at 272; James Madi-
son, Letter to Clarkson Crolius (Dec. 1819), reprinted in COMPLETE, supra note 22, at 270; 
James Madison, Letter to D. Lynch, Jr. (June 27, 1817), reprinted in Complete, supra note 
22, at 271. 
 48. “Madison’s political thought was characterized by an often agonized effort to find 
a working balance between the rights of property and republican principles.” NEDELSKY, 
supra note 38, at 12. 
 49. E.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).  
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sensation of universal insecurity.”50 Even so, in the words of Chan-
cellor James Kent, “private interest must be made subservient to 
the general interest of the community.”51 
During the nineteenth century and the early twentieth cen-
tury, jurists conceptualized free expression similarly to other indi-
vidual rights. Lower courts and eventually the U.S. Supreme 
Court consistently allowed the government to punish speech or 
writing that supposedly engendered bad tendencies because such 
expression undermined virtue and contravened the common 
good.52 For example, in a case upholding a conviction under a state 
flag desecration statute, the Court reasoned, “It is familiar law 
that even the privileges of citizenship and the rights inhering in 
personal liberty are subject, in their enjoyment, to such reasona-
ble restraints as may be required for the general good.”53 Conse-
quently, because the flag was an important “symbol of [the] coun-
try’s power and prestige,” a statute prohibiting the display of the 
flag in advertisements did not violate “any right of personal lib-
erty.”54 Similarly, in several World War I Espionage Act cases, the 
Court upheld convictions of defendants for protesting against the 
draft and the war. In Debs v. United States, the Court explicitly 
approved jury instructions that tracked the bad tendency doc-
trine: “[T]he jury were most carefully instructed that they could 
not find the defendant guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions 
unless the words used had as their natural tendency and reasona-
bly probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service, &c.”55 
At this point, an assessment of Charles Beard’s interpreta-
tion of the framing is in order. Beard maintained that an economic 
interpretation best explained the Constitution and its framing. 
The Constitution, he concluded, “was an economic document 
drawn with superb skill by men whose property interests were im-
mediately at stake; and as such it appealed directly and unerringly 
 50. Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 221 (1822). For additional examples, see Cal-
der v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.); VanHorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 
28 F.Cas. 1012 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857); Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 
Yer.) 599 (1831); Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825). 
 51. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 276 (1827; Legal Classics 
Library Reprint). 
 52. E.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 276–77 (1915); Patterson v. Colorado ex 
rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); Commonwealth v. Karvonen, 106 N.E. 
556 (Mass. 1914); Commonwealth v. Morris, 3 Va. 176 (1811). 
 53. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 42 (1907). 
 54. Id. 
 55. 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). As was commonly done, the Court also stated that the 
government must prove that the defendant had specific intent, but this requirement could 
be satisfied by constructive intent (which followed from proof of bad tendencies). Id.  
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to identical interests in the country at large.”56 To put it crassly, a 
wealthy minority designed the Constitution to protect the inter-
ests of the wealthy. In the words of Leonard Levy, Beard con-
strued “the Constitution as a conservative economic document 
framed by an unrepresentative minority employing undemocratic 
means to protect personal property interests by establishing a cen-
tral government responsive to their needs and able to thwart pop-
ulistic majorities in the states.”57 Beard, in other words, inter-
preted the Constitution and the framing as if all the citizens, 
including the framers—especially the framers—were homines 
economici (that is, economic selves or rational self-maximizers).58 
For Beard, the private subsumed the public: The Constitution 
metamorphosed into a private sphere document. As Beard 
phrased it, the Constitution sprang “essentially out of conflicts of 
economic interests.”59 
Beard was, at best, partly right and partly wrong—but none-
theless significantly wrong. The framers unquestionably wanted 
to protect economic interests, and they undoubtedly were aware 
of their own interests. Yet, contrary to Beard’s assertions, the 
framers also genuinely believed in the virtuous pursuit of the com-
mon good.60 They were not wielding republican democratic prin-
ciples merely as a pretext. Thus, the framers memorialized the 
governmental goal of the common good in the Preamble of the 
Constitution: “We the People” aimed to “promote the General 
Welfare.”61 Ultimately, the constitutional system was based on 
balance: balance between governmental power and the protection 
 56. BEARD, supra note 1, at 188. 
 57. Leonard Levy, Introduction—The Making of the Constitution, 1776-1789, in 
ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION ix, xxxi–xxxii (2d ed. 1987). Levy color-
fully added, “The Economic Interpretation is written in the same spirit that would describe 
the performances of a great violin virtuoso as the scraping of horse hair on dried cats’ guts.” 
Id. at xxxi. 
 58. “The neoclassical economists’ Homo Economicus has several characteristics, the 
most important of which are (1) maximizing (optimizing) behavior; (2) the cognitive ability 
to exercise rational choice; and (3) individualistic behavior and independent tastes and 
preferences.” Chris Doucouliagos, A Note on the Evolution of Homo Economicus, 28 J. 
ECON. ISSUES, 877, 877–878 (1994); see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (discussing and criticizing concept of 
homo economicus); Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on 
the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 973 (2000) 
(same). 
 59. Charles A. BEARD, Introduction to the 1935 Edition, reprinted in Beard, supra 
note 1, at xli, xliii. 
 60. E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 
(James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison). 
 61. U.S. CONST. pmbl.  
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of property and other rights. From the framers’ perspective, citi-
zens were partly good and partly bad.62 Men were not “angels,” 
but neither were they beasts.63 This was no less true of the framers 
themselves than of other citizens. Experience unfortunately had 
shown that, in republican government, passion and interest fre-
quently overpower reason.64 Nonetheless—and this point is cru-
cial—Publius unequivocally believed not only that a virtuous elite 
existed but also that the American people as a whole possessed 
sufficient virtue to sustain republican government. The framers 
neither repudiated republican democracy nor accepted factional 
and self-interested government as inevitable. The framers’ con-
certed effort to construct a republican government at the national 
level, Publius recognized, “presupposes the existence” of men’s 
virtue.65 Without such virtue, “nothing less than the chains of des-
potism” would be possible.66 
II. THE TRANSITION TO PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: 
FREE EXPRESSION BECOMES A CONSTITUTIONAL 
LODESTAR 
Grounded on the rural, agrarian, and relatively homogene-
ous American society of the nineteenth century, republican de-
mocracy persisted, but a variety of forces strained the regime in 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.67 These forces, 
including industrialization, urbanization, and immigration, even-
tually led, in the 1930s, to the rise of pluralist democracy and the 
collapse of the republican democratic regime. Mainstream and 
old-stock Protestant values, long the foundation for the republi-
can democratic ideals of virtue and the common good, were now 
to be balanced with the values of other Americans who consti-
tuted the demographically diverse population. No single set of 
cultural values was authoritative. Ethical relativism took hold as 
a political reality: All values, all interests—or at least a plurality 
 62. MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 127 
(1987). 
 63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); see WHITE, supra note 62, at 97 (tying 
to Hume). 
 64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison). 
 66. Id.; see MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 70–77 (arguing that Southerners and New 
Englanders conceptualized virtue with different emphases). Madison viewed the state-
level experiments in republicanism in the 1780s to be partial successes. Those successes 
could be attributed only to “the virtue and intelligence of the people of America.” THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). 
 67. FELDMAN, supra note 20, at 166–97 (discussing in greater detail the development 
and effects of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration).  
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of values and interests—mattered to Franklin Roosevelt and the 
New Dealers.68 Democracy now revolved around the assertion of 
interests and values by sundry individuals and groups. The pursuit 
of self-interest no longer amounted to corruption; rather it de-
fined the nature of (pluralist) democracy. Diverse voluntary or-
ganizations, interest groups, and lobbyists openly sought to press 
their claims through the democratic process.69 
For much of the 1930s, conservative Supreme Court justices 
resisted the transition to pluralist democracy and attempted to 
continue enforcing republican democratic principles.70 This judi-
cial resistance provoked Roosevelt’s court-packing proposal, a 
blatant political gesture intended to compel the justices to accept 
the New Deal and (implicitly) pluralist democracy.71 By the end 
of the decade, though—the turning point is usually deemed to be 
1937—the Court had accepted the transition and stopped at-
tempting to uphold the republican democratic principles of virtue 
and the common good.72 Around this same time, political theorists 
began to explicate the new form of democracy. The foundation 
for the incipient democratic theory was the scholarly embrace of 
relativism. While totalitarian governments, such as those in Nazi 
Germany and Stalinist Russia, claimed knowledge of objective 
values and forcefully imposed those values and concomitant goals 
on their peoples, democratic governments allowed their citizens 
to express multitudes of values and goals.73 The key to democracy 
lay not in the specification of supposedly objective goals, such as 
the common good, but rather in the following of processes that 
allowed all citizens to voice their particular values and interests 
within a free and open democratic arena.74 After World War II, 
numerous political theorists celebrated pluralist democracy as the 
 68. E.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Speech (Sept. 23, 1932), re-
printed in 3 GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 335, 341–42 (Richard Hofstadter ed., 
1982). Roosevelt was far more solicitous of African American interests than any previous 
president, yet he often sacrificed black interests and values so as to keep white Southerners 
aligned with the Democratic party. FELDMAN, supra note 20, at 327–28. Also, Roosevelt 
eventually broke with and became antagonistic toward big business. Id. at 318–19, 324. 
 69. See LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL 254–57, 362–66 (1990) (discussing 
the transformation of ethnic urbanites into active participants on the national political 
stage). Lobbying became open, aggressive, and institutionalized. Id. at 362. 
 70. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 147–94 (1993). 
 71. 81 CONG. REC. 877 (1937). 
 72. JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME 
COURT (2010); see FELDMAN, supra note 20, at 349–59 (discussing the 1937 switch). 
 73. See John Dewey & James H. Tufts, Ethics (1932 ed.), reprinted in JOHN DEWEY, 
7 THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 1, 359 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1985). 
 74. JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 176 (1939).  
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best means for accommodating “our multigroup society.”75 The 
only way to determine public values and goals, they explained, is 
“through the free competition of interest groups.”76 By “compos-
ing or compromising” their different values and interests,77 the 
“competing groups [would] coordinate their aims in programs 
they can all support.”78 Legislative decisions therefore turned on 
negotiation, persuasion, and the exertion of pressure through the 
normal channels of the democratic process.79 
Many scholars and jurists emphasized that free expression 
was a prerequisite to the pluralist democratic process. According 
to this self-governance rationale for protecting free speech and 
writing, free expression allows diverse groups and individuals to 
contribute their views in the pluralist political arena. If govern-
mental officials interfere with the pluralist process, if they dictate 
or control public debates, then they skew the democratic out-
comes and undermine the consent of the governed. In his book, 
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, Alexander Mei-
klejohn emphasized that the need to protect political expression 
“springs from the necessities of the program of self-govern-
ment,”80 or in other words, from “the structure and functioning of 
our political system as a whole.”81 Thus, pursuant to the self-gov-
ernance rationale under pluralist democracy, free expression be-
came a constitutional “lodestar.”82 In a stark about-face from the 
Court’s consistent repudiation of First Amendment claims during 
the republican democratic era, the justices began to uphold one 
free-speech claim after another.83 In the words of Robert A. Dahl, 
 75. WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. MOOS, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 9 (1949). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 8. 
 79. Id. at 10–11. Robert Dahl has presented, perhaps, the most comprehensive ex-
planations of the democratic process. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 
(1989) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY (1956). 
 80. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 26 (1948). 
 81. Id. at 18. 
 82. G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free 
Speech In Twentieth Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (1996). 
 83. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding that labor picketing is 
protected free speech); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating conviction for 
distributing handbills); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (upholding right of unions to 
organize in streets). “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, re-
ligion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  
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“the democratic process does not exist” without free expression.84 
Even so, conservative scholars and justices, in particular, did not 
always agree that free expression should receive special judicial 
protection.85 They often reasoned, for example, that governmen-
tal interests outweighed First Amendment protections.86 
Since its emergence during the 1930s, pluralist democracy has 
not remained static. While its basic principles, such as the oppor-
tunity to participate in the democratic process, have remained in-
tact, its practice has evolved. For instance, from its outset, with its 
emphasis on the individual pursuit of self-interest, pluralist de-
mocracy resonated with capitalist ideology. But during the post-
World War II era, the practice of democracy increasingly inter-
twined with the expanding mass-consumer culture. The Court rec-
ognized as much in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, which held unconstitutional a state 
law that prohibited licensed pharmacists from advertising pre-
scription drug prices.87 Democracy involves the allocation of re-
sources in society, the Court explained, but most resource-alloca-
tion decisions are made through the economic marketplace. 
“Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may 
seem, is . . . dissemination of information as to who is producing 
and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price,” Jus-
tice Blackmun wrote for an eight-justice majority.88 Consequently, 
advertising is essential for “the proper allocation of resources in a 
free enterprise system.”89 In short, the American pluralist democ-
racy had become a consumers’ democracy.90 Not only was com-
merce and advertising central to democracy, but also politics had 
grown increasingly like commercial consumption. Citizens fol-
lowed their own values and interests, whether shopping for a 
 84. DEMOCRACY, supra note 79, at 170; see id. at 169–75 (discussing free speech and 
other rights integral to the democratic process); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times 
Case, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208 (emphasizing importance of free expression). 
 85. WALTER BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1957). 
 86. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (holding that conviction of 
American Communist leaders did not violate the First Amendment). 
 87. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 88. Id. at 765. 
 89. Id. 
 90. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC (2003); GARY CROSS, AN ALL-
CONSUMING CENTURY: WHY COMMERCIALISM WON IN MODERN AMERICA (2000); 
Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce and Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
697 (1993).  
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product or a candidate.91 Election campaigns became “indistin-
guishable in form (and often in content) from product marketing 
campaigns.”92 
The consumers’ democracy continued to evolve as corpora-
tions grew in size, wealth, and power. By the close of the twentieth 
century, multinational corporations dominated the mass-con-
sumer culture as never before.93 Individuals rarely bought their 
mass-produced items at independent Mom-and-Pop stores. In-
stead, people shopped at Target, or a Walmart Supercenter, or 
online at Amazon.com. The American economy had thoroughly 
transformed into a corporate capitalist system.94 Consequently, 
pluralist democracy also was transformed as corporations more 
resolutely used their bureaucratic organizations and accumulated 
wealth to intervene in the pluralist democratic marketplace.95 In 
other words, while democratic politics had previously become 
more market-oriented, now corporate capitalism became more 
overtly political. The consumers’ democracy had become Democ-
racy, Inc.96 With ever increasing proficiency, corporations manip-
ulate elections and government for their own advantage—bene-
fiting the respective corporations as well as corporate business in 
toto.97 Citizens still vote, but corporations strongly influence 
“highly managed elections” and shape governmental policy be-
tween elections.98 Corporate and governmental power coexist in-
cestuously, with officials going back and forth between corporate 
and governmental positions.99 Thus, the system readily self-prop-
 91. “[S]elf-interested citizens increasingly view government policies like other mar-
ket transactions, judging them by how well served they feel personally.” COHEN, supra 
note 90, at 9. 
 92. Collins & Skover, supra note 90, at 725. 
 93. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 173–75 (2003). 
 94. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 23–151 (1992 ed.) (describing 
McWorld); KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 229–32, 284–86 (2002) (explain-
ing the process of corporate transnationalization); cf., ROBERT L. KERR, THE CORPORATE 
FREE-SPEECH MOVEMENT (2008) (describing how corporations used the First Amend-
ment to their advantage). 
 95. KERR, supra note 94, at 7–8. 
 96. Democracy Incorporated is the title of a book by Sheldon S. Wolin, SHELDON S. 
WOLIN, DEMOCRACY INCORPORATED (2008), while Democracy, Inc. is the title of a book 
by David S. Allen. DAVID S. ALLEN, DEMOCRACY, INC. (2005). 
 97. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 118–19 
(2010). 
 98. WOLIN, supra note 96, at 149. 
 99. Id. at 63, 135–36 (describing “dual system of state and corporation”); see PETER 
SCHWEIZER, THROW THEM ALL OUT xvii–xix (2011) (showing that congressional mem-
bers reap financial benefits).  
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agates: Corporate wealth skews electoral outcomes and govern-
mental policies, while governmental officials and policies further 
contribute to wealth inequality, in general, and corporate power, 
more specifically.100 
III. THE ROBERTS COURT AND DEMOCRACY, INC. 
The Roberts Court is the most pro-business Supreme Court 
of the post-World War II era.101 Five of the current justices rank 
among the top ten justices most favorable to business from the 
1946 through the 2011 terms.102 Justice Alito and Chief Justice 
Roberts are first and second on the list.103 In fact, the Roberts 
Court interprets the Constitution as if Charles Beard had been 
correct: The Constitution is an economic document designed to 
protect the interests of the wealthy (the framers and their cohort). 
The Court has demonstrated its pro-business inclination in a mul-
titude of cases.104 Perhaps, the most important series of such cases 
involves campaign finance and free expression, given that cam-
paign finance issues focus on the intersection between democratic 
politics and wealth. Partly because of the evolution of pluralist de-
mocracy into, first, a consumers’ democracy, and next, Democ-
racy, Inc., the conservative justices have become far more recep-
tive to free-expression claims, particularly when free expression 
intertwines with the economic marketplace. 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the con-
servative bloc of five justices invalidated provisions of the Bipar-
tisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) that imposed limits 
on corporate (and union) spending for political campaign adver-
tisements.105 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion began by articu-
lating two First Amendment premises. First, the Court reiterated 
 100. For example, besides the obvious influence of governmental tax policies on 
wealth distribution, governmental policies regarding unions, executive pay, and financial 
markets have contributed to increasing wealth inequality. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 
97, at 47–70; see PHILLIPS, supra note 94, at 201–48 (explaining how governmental policies 
affected wealth accumulation throughout American history). 
 101. Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1431 (2013); see MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE 
ROBERTS COURT (2013) (noting that some conservatives insist that Roberts Court is not 
pro-business but concluding that, overall, it is). 
 102. Epstein et al., supra note 101, at 1472–73. 
 103. Id. at 1449–51. 
 104. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (limiting 
human rights suits against corporations); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 
(2011) (restricting class actions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 105. 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81; see Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 319–22 (discussing statutory restrictions).  
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the maxim, initially stated in Buckley v. Valeo,106 that spending on 
political campaigns constitutes speech.107 Second, the Court em-
phasized that, as stated in First National Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti,108 free-speech protections extend to corporations.109 With 
those premises in hand, the Court moved to the crux of its reason-
ing, that free expression must be a constitutional lodestar in 
American democracy. “Speech is an essential mechanism of de-
mocracy,” Kennedy wrote.110 “The right of citizens to inquire, to 
hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a pre-
condition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means 
to protect it.”111 From the Court’s perspective, then, corporate ex-
penditures on political campaigns go the core of the First Amend-
ment. Restrictions on such political speech and writing destroy 
“liberty” and are necessarily unconstitutional,112 unless the gov-
ernment can satisfy strict scrutiny by showing that the regulation 
is necessary to achieve a compelling purpose.113 
Could the government satisfy strict scrutiny? The prevention 
of governmental corruption constitutes a compelling purpose, and 
empirical evidence shows that excessive wealth corrupts the dem-
ocratic process in multiple ways.114 Excessive wealth can influence 
not only who is elected to office but also which constituents are 
served by government.115 Elected officials are far more likely to 
respond to wealthy campaign contributors and to ignore the 
poor.116 Yet, the Citizens United Court defined the concept of cor-
ruption so narrowly that this evidence was rendered irrelevant.117 
 106. 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). 
 107. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336–41. 
 108. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 109. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–42. 
 110. Id. at 339. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 354 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 130 (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 
1961) (James Madison)). 
 113. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. 
 114. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003) (discussing con-
gressional findings of corruption); Brief of Amici Curiae Hachette Book Group, Inc. and 
HarperCollins Publishers L.L.C. in Support of Neither Party on Supplemental Questions, 
13–14, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205) 
(same). 
 115. Larry M. Bartels et al., Inequality and American Governance, in INEQUALITY 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 88, 115 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005); 
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme 
Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 684 (2010). 
 116. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 2–3, 285–86 (2008). 
 117. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–62; see Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corrup-
tion, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 118–21 (2010) (arguing that the Citizens United Court overly 
narrowed the concept of corruption); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance  
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According to Kennedy’s opinion, only a direct contribution to a 
candidate or officeholder can constitute corruption or its appear-
ance.118 An independent expenditure, even on behalf of a specific 
candidate or officeholder, cannot do so.119 Anything short of a 
bribe or the appearance of a bribe is permissible.120 The govern-
ment, it seems, cannot justify any regulation of expenditures, 
whether by corporations or others.121 Ultimately, then, the Citi-
zens United majority concluded that the government could not 
satisfy strict scrutiny and that the BCRA restrictions on expendi-
tures were therefore unconstitutional.122 
The message of Citizens United is that money—no matter the 
quantity—cannot corrupt democracy, except in extraordinarily 
limited circumstances. The Court, in effect, proclaimed that cor-
porations and other wealthy individuals and entities can spend un-
limited sums in their efforts to determine elections and govern-
mental policies. In the democratic sphere, wealth and corporate 
power are now unfettered. Money can be expended indiscrimi-
nately on politics, and governmental regulations of spending are 
constitutionally suspect. “The censorship we now confront is vast 
in its reach,” the Court stated about the BCRA.123 “The Govern-
ment has ‘muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most signif-
icant segments of the economy.’”124 From this perspective, speech 
does not emanate from people, from citizens, but from “segments 
of the economy.”125 The private economic sphere has subsumed 
the public sphere.126 
What, ultimately, justified this conclusion in Citizens United? 
Unsurprisingly, the conservative majority in Citizens United, like 
Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (arguing that the Citizens United Court’s narrowing of the 
definition of corruption was the most important part of the case). 
 118. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–57. 
 119. Id. at 357–59. 
 120. See id. at 356–60. 
 121. Kang, supra note 117, at 25–26. 
 122. 558 U.S. at 356–61. 
 123. Id. at 354. 
 124. Id. (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part)) (emphasis 
added). 
 125. Id. 
 126. The Court underscored its determination to protect the private sphere and eco-
nomic action in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., which extended the First Amendment to protect 
marketplace activities that were only tenuously connected to expression. 131 S. Ct. 2653 
(2011). Sorrell invalidated a state statute that prevented pharmacies from selling infor-
mation about prescriptions.  
 
3 - FELDMANBEARD (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2014  9:38 AM 
342 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:323 
in other cases, claimed to follow an originalist method of interpre-
tation.127 “There is simply no support for the view that the First 
Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppres-
sion of political speech by media corporations,” the Court 
stated.128 Indeed, the Court could have cited Charles Beard’s Eco-
nomic Interpretation to bolster this interpretation of the framing 
and the Constitution. Like Beard, the Court transformed the Con-
stitution into a private-sphere document. Viewing this connection 
from the opposite side, Beard comes into focus as a prescient for-
tuneteller. While he incorrectly interpreted the history of the 
framing, he predicted the future with amazing foresight. His eco-
nomic interpretation of the Constitution became the Roberts 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, Beard was 
aware that a conservative Supreme Court could rely on his book 
to support an economic interpretation of the Constitution—an 
economic interpretation that could thwart the Progressive legisla-
tion that Beard would have supported politically.129 After all, one 
could reasonably argue that if “the intention of the Framers was 
to establish a capitalistic order, then any legislation aimed at re-
stricting the excesses of capitalism was unconstitutional.”130 
Beard’s awareness of this potential conservative reliance on his 
work provided the first inkling of his preternatural clairvoyance: 
A Supreme Court justice, in fact, first cited An Economic Inter-
pretation for this conservative (and originalist) proposition in 
1934. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell held that 
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law did not violate the 
contract clause.131 Justice Sutherland, dissenting, argued the fram-
ers had drafted the contract clause to preclude states from enact-
ing statutes that interfered with contracts of credit and debt (like 
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law).132 In support of this 
 127. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (interpreting Second 
Amendment supposedly pursuant to originalist methods). The Citizens United conserva-
tives, it should be noted, devoted less space to originalism than has been given to it in some 
other cases. TUSHNET, supra note 101, at 279–80. 
 128. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353. In dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the major-
ity’s originalist argument. “This is not only because the Framers and their contemporaries 
conceived of speech more narrowly than we now think of it, but also because they held 
very different views about the nature of the First Amendment right and the role of corpo-
rations in society.” Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Stevens added, 
“The Framers thus took it as a given that corporations could be comprehensively regulated 
in the service of the public welfare.” Id. at 428 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 129. See McDonald, supra note 4, at xv. 
 130. Id. 
 131. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 132. Id. at 458–60.  
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argument, Sutherland quoted a lengthy passage from An Eco-
nomic Interpretation.133 
The Roberts Court conservatives have pushed the Citizens 
United holding and the Beardsian First Amendment interpreta-
tion in subsequent campaign finance cases. In Arizona Free En-
terprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the State of Ari-
zona created a legislative “matching funds scheme” for campaign 
financing.134 Under this scheme, a candidate for state office who 
accepted public financing would receive additional funds if a pri-
vately financed opponent spent more than the publicly financed 
candidate’s initial allocation. Thus, publicly and privately fi-
nanced candidates would be able to spend roughly the same 
amounts on their respective campaigns. In a five-to-four decision, 
the conservative majority held this campaign finance scheme un-
constitutional. The Court reasoned that the flexible public financ-
ing system imposed a “penalty” by diminishing the privately fi-
nanced candidate’s expression.135 In dissent, Justice Kagan 
suggested that the majority’s reasoning was exactly backwards: 
The public financing, she explained, “subsidizes and so produces 
more political speech.”136 But the conservative majority was ada-
mant: Any regulation of campaign financing constituted an un-
constitutional burden on free speech. “[E]ven if the matching 
funds provision did result in more speech by publicly financed 
candidates and more speech in general, it would do so at the ex-
pense of impermissibly burdening (and thus reducing) the speech 
of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure 
groups.”137 In effect, then, an individual’s wealth translates into 
political power, and the government cannot diminish that 
power—for instance, by providing equal funding to the less 
wealthy. 
In a second case, American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. 
Bullock, a Montana statute provided that a “corporation may not 
 133. Id. at 458 n.3 (quoting BEARD, supra note 1, at 31–32). After Blaisdell, justices 
have cited Beard’s Economic Interpretation only twice more, both again in dissents. Bell v. 
State of Md., a civil rights case, upheld a conviction of African American sit-in protesters. 
378 U.S. 226 (1964). Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that the Court was following a 
Beardsian approach by exalting “property in suppression of individual rights.” Id. at 253 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing BEARD, supra note 1, at 188). In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, Jus-
tice Powell cited Beard for the uncontroversial proposition that the framers drafted the 
commerce clause partly because “trade and commercial problems” had arisen among the 
states. 447 U.S. 429, 447–48 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 134. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011). 
 135. Id. at 2818. 
 136. Id. at 2833 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 137. Id. at 2821.  
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make . . . an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a po-
litical committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a politi-
cal party.”138 The Montana Supreme Court upheld this statute in 
the face of a First Amendment challenge based on Citizens 
United. The Montana Court reasoned that the specific history in 
the state—of corporate corruption of democracy—supported the 
state’s claim that the regulation was narrowly tailored to achieve 
a compelling purpose.139 In yet another five-to-four decision, the 
conservative justices on the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In a 
per curiam opinion reversing the Montana Court, the justices rea-
soned that “[t]here can be no serious doubt” that Citizens United 
controlled and precluded the state from even attempting to satisfy 
the strict scrutiny test.140 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Charles Beard interpreted the history of the framing so that 
the Constitution appeared to be, above all else, an economic doc-
ument sheltering individuals as they pursued their self-interest, 
whether in the private or public sphere. On this crucial point, 
Beard was wrong. True, Madison and other framers believed that 
many citizens would follow their passions and interests while ig-
noring reason and virtue. But the main thrust of Federalist, Num-
ber 10, was that, despite this propensity in the citizenship, the na-
tion should not succumb to passions, interests, and factional rule. 
Instead, the framers insisted that, in the public sphere, reason and 
virtue should control passion and interest. Passion and interest 
might have free rein in the private sphere—but not in the public 
sphere. The two spheres must remain separable—and usually, 
government power should be in balance with individual rights—
but if anything, the public sometimes needs to predominate over 
the private. 
In Citizens United and other cases, the Roberts Court has in-
terpreted the Constitution to echo the Beardsian approach. The 
private sphere subsumes the public. Rational self-maximization, 
apropos in the private sphere, becomes the governing rule of con-
duct in the public sphere. But contrary to the Roberts Court’s as-
sertions, originalism cannot justify this economic interpretation of 
the Constitution. If Beard is wrong historically—and he is—then 
 138. 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (quoting Mont. Code Ann. §13-35-227(1) (2011)). 
 139. 132 S. Ct. at 2491; id. at 2491–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing W. Tradition 
P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 363 Mont. 220 (2011)). 
 140. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. at 2491.  
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the Roberts Court is wrong, too. Yet, if original meaning (or fram-
ers’ intent) does not explain the economic interpretation, is there 
an alternative explanation—if not justification? In his Introduc-
tion to the 1935 Edition of his book, Beard maintained that his 
historical analysis was “coldly neutral” and “impartial.”141 Of 
course, as part-and-parcel to its purported originalist method, the 
Supreme Court conservatives likewise claim to pronounce neutral 
and apolitical decisions.142 Why, then, do Beard and the Roberts 
Court conservatives find the Constitution to be an economic doc-
ument when other historians, such as Gordon Wood, perceive a 
different Constitution? 
Despite the claims to apolitical neutrality, politics helps ex-
plain Beard’s and the justices’ interpretations of constitutional 
history and text, though the precise manner and degree to which 
politics infuses their interpretive approaches are subject to de-
bate. To be sure, Beard and the conservative Roberts Court jus-
tices stand on opposite ends of the political spectrum, yet their 
political outlooks nonetheless overlap at a general level. Beard 
was a Progressive historian who viewed societal changes as arising 
from conflicts among vested interests.143 The Roberts Court con-
servatives, like many other conservatives of this era, believe that 
self-interested marketplace transactions are more efficient than 
and otherwise preferable to government-directed actions. Thus, 
Beard and the conservative justices would agree (at a general 
level) that self-interest politically motivates most, if not all, indi-
viduals. Several different theoretical approaches describe how 
politics shapes Supreme Court decisionmaking. These same theo-
retical approaches suggest how both Beard and the Roberts Court 
conservatives interpret the history of the framing so that the Con-
stitution becomes, in their eyes, an economic document. 
 141. Beard, supra note 59, at xliv–vi. 
 142. E.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 920 (2004) 
(memorandum of Scalia, J.) (insisting that justices should not be political). Numerous 
scholars claim that originalism is the only apolitical interpretive method. Indeed, they usu-
ally claim that any proposed alternatives ultimately leave the interpreter totally uncon-
strained. GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 395 (2010); Stephen G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two 
Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 701 (2009); Michael W. 
McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388, 2415 (2006); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 
U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855, 862–63 (1989). 
 143. Progressives constantly emphasized that vested business interests were corrupt-
ing government. E.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 28–
29 (1904); see JOHN CHAMBERS, THE TYRANNY OF CHANGE 160 (2d ed. 1992); RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 215–17, 257 (1955); see also id. at 198–214 (discussing 
Beard).  
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For instance, some scholars, including many political scien-
tists, would argue that Citizens United is a product of pure poli-
tics.144 The conservative justices outvoted their liberal colleagues 
and, consequently, imposed their political preferences. Might the 
same be true of Beard? Indeed, he did not need to outvote any-
body. He merely needed to impose unilaterally his political vision 
on the framing. Other scholars instead maintain that the Court 
generally follows the political mainstream.145 From this perspec-
tive, Citizens United and its progeny seem predictable, if not inev-
itable, given that the Roberts Court operates within the parame-
ters of Democracy, Inc. Similarly, one might argue, Beard 
followed the Progressive mainstream with his economic interpre-
tation. Yet, another theoretical approach maintains that, in most 
cases, the justices sincerely interpret the Constitution but, because 
interpretation is never mechanical, politics is necessarily an inte-
gral part of the process. In other words, the justices naturally vote 
in accord with their politics even as they sincerely interpret the 
constitutional text.146 In Citizens United, then, the conservative 
justices sincerely interpreted the framing and the First Amend-
ment in natural accordance with their political views. The same 
would hold true for Beard. 
In any event, one cannot reasonably explain either Citizens 
United or Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution 
as products of originalism. The economic interpretation of the 
Constitution does not correspond with either the original public 
meaning or the framers’ intentions.147 The framers were serious 
about protecting property rights, but simultaneously, they were 
serious about empowering the government to act for the common 
 144. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
 145. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008 (2009). In political science, 
this approach is called regimism. E.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: 
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Terri Peretti, Con-
structing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275 (2010); 
see Stephen M. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics Into Mayon-
naise, GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming) [hereinafter Feldman, Alchemy] (explaining 
regimist approach). 
 146. See Feldman, Alchemy, supra note 145 (comparing institutional interpretivism to 
other approaches); Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmo-
nizing the Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 89, 99–124 (2005) (introducing the approach). 
 147. I do not mean to suggest implicitly that originalism sometimes provides clear and 
certain answers to constitutional issues. It does not. See Stephen M. Feldman, Constitu-
tional Interpretation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, BYU J. PUB. L. (forth-
coming) (criticizing new originalism as being historically unjustified).  
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good, even at the expense of private rights. The economic inter-
pretation disregards the latter concern of the framers. The eco-
nomic interpretation treats property rights as sacrosanct, but the 
framers did not do so. The framers had a more sensible and bal-
anced understanding of property. On the one hand, they under-
stood that property must be protected and that property can mo-
tivate people to act in positive ways. On the other hand, they 
understood that property was also a primary source of the greed 
that could generate factions and corrupt government. The govern-
ment must have ultimate control over property, and not vice 
versa. 
Yet, in a sense, one might nonetheless attribute partial re-
sponsibility to the framers for Citizens United and Beard’s book—
call it blame or praise, depending on one’s political outlook. 
Wood and other historians explain that the American Revolution 
and constitutional framing unleashed social and cultural forces 
that would change America in ways beyond the anticipation of the 
founding generation.148 True, the founders might have conceived 
of the citizen in a particular manner—they might have aimed for 
a balance between property rights and governmental power—but 
forces beyond the founders’ control would ineluctably change the 
nation, as it would become increasingly commercial and indus-
trial. In other words, from this perspective, the founders might 
have unwittingly created a society that would render their repub-
lican democratic principles of virtue and the common good anach-
ronisms in the twenty-first century.149 Of course, even if this his-
torical view is correct, one does not have to accept the Roberts 
Court’s economic Constitution as a foregone necessity anymore 
than one has to accept Beard’s book as the best history. 
Finally, I want to emphasize that I am not advocating for a 
return to republican democracy as it was originally understood 
and implemented. Such a return is neither desirable nor possi-
ble.150 Even if republican democratic government could be sepa-
rated from the exclusionary practices that so often characterized 
 148. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1789-1815, 1–4 (2009); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 3–8 (1991); see JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER 
(1984) (arguing that Americans increasingly accepted liberal capitalism in 1790s). 
 149. See NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 1–14 (explaining that the Constitution ulti-
mately gives too much protection to property despite Madison’s desire to achieve a bal-
ance). 
 150. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICS AND THE SUPREME 
COURT: LAW, POWER, AND DEMOCRACY 85–92 (2013) (explaining how the early neocon-
servative goal of resurrecting republican democracy was doomed to fail).  
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it—for instance, the denial of political rights to women and mi-
norities—it was also tied to the agrarian, rural, and (partially) ho-
mogenous American society of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. That society no longer exists and cannot be resurrected. 
Regardless, within the parameters of pluralist democracy, the 
Court can uphold legislative controls on the intersection of wealth 
and politics. The Court, without returning to republican democ-
racy, can still seek to balance governmental power and property 
rights, as the framers aimed to do. In short, the Court can refuse 
to allow the private to subsume the public. Democratic politics 
should not be at the whim of wealth. 
 
 
